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FIRST DAY FIRST SECTION 
VIRGINL'-\ BOARD OF R~.R EXA!IINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - June 25-26, 1973 
1. Shad Roe instituted an action against John Doe for 
breach of an oral warranty made in connection with the pur-
chase of a horse by Roe from Doe. For one reason or another 
the trial of the case was d.elayed for several years and when 
the matter finally cane to trial Scrivener was called as a 
witness for the plaintiff. 
Scrievener testified that he had heard a discussion 
between the parties relating to the sale and purchase of the 
horse at the time the sale was consur:-!Il.1atec1. He further testi-
fied that he had been concerned that there ni9ht be later liti-
gation regarding the sale so he had gone home immediately and 
had written down exactly what each party had said. He testified 
that he could not recall any of the statements of the parties · 
but offeretl to read the memorandwn he had made at the time. The 
defendant objected to the reading of the illernorandum. 
How should the Court rule? 
2. Roanoke Farn Equipr·aent Company comrnenced an action 
in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County, Virginia, against Harold 
Far:ner to recover the purchase of $475 for an acticle of farm 
machinery. The motion for judgment charged that plaintiff had 
especially designed antl manufactured the article of farm ma-
chinery at the request of the defendant, and that tender of de-
livery of said machinery had been raade to defendant within ninety 
days of the date of the oral agree'."'lent, which was within the· 
time called for by the agreement. The notion for judgment fur-
ther charged that defendant had refused to accept delivery. 
The defendant filed grounds of defense wherein he assigned as 
his only defense to the action that he had not entered into the 
alleged oral agreement with plaintiff. At the trial of the ac-
tion, plaintiff offered evidence to prove the facts alleged in 
the motion for judgment. Defendant testified that he had not 
entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff, as charged in 
the motion for judgment. Counsel for defendant then asked de-
fendant whether the farm machinery, sought to be delivered to 
him by plaintiff, was manufactured according to the design al-
leged by plaintiff to have been called for by the alleged agree-
ment. Counsel for plaintiff objected to the question. 
/ 
How should the court rule on the objection? 
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3. Happy and Content lived together as man and wife in 
Nevada which recognized this relationship as a valid common 
law marriage. Happy who died intestate in Nevada was survived 
by Content. He owned a valuable farm in Virginia. 
Is Content entitled to dower in this farm? ~),' 
4. William Smith commenced an action in the Circuit 
Court of Rockbridge County, Virginia, against Bump-a-Long 
Trucking Company, Inc. and Valley Transportation Company, Inc., 
to recover damages to a warehouse owned by plaintiff. In the 
motion for judgment plaintiff charged that each defendant was 
guilty of negligence in the op~ration of its vehicle with a 
result that both vehicles left the highway and ran into the 
warehouse owned by plaintiff. Bump-a-Long Trucking Company, 
Inc., after being served with process, promptly filed a counter-
claim against plaintiff seeking to recover money claimed to be 
due it by reason of an alleged breach of contract, and it also 
filed a cross claim against Valley Transportation Company, Inc., 
seeking to recover for an alleged breach of contract. Smith 
and Valley Transportation Company, Inc., respectively, by 
proper pleadings, each challenged the right of Bump-a-Long 
Trucking Company, Inc., to prosecute in the pending action the 
counterclaim and cross claim. 
How should the Court rule~ 
(a) On the counterclaim? 
(b) On the cross claim? 
5. On the 11th day of May, 1973, Joseph Bailey, a resi-
dent of Stafford County, Virginia, commenced an action in the 
Circuit Court of that county, against William Hampton, a resi-
dent of Goochland County, ~irginia, to recover damages for 
personal injuries he sustained as a result of an automobile 
collision. The motion for judgment alleged that the accident 
occurred in Nelson County, Virginia, on the 20th day of April, 
1973. The motion for judgment, with notice of motion at-
tached, was served upon the defendant in Stafford County, Vir-
ginia, on the 16th day of Hay, 1973. The defendant failed to 
appear and plead within twenty-one days of the date of the ser-
vice of process. On June 11, 1973, the defendant appeard by 
counsel before the Judge of the Circuit Gourt of Stafford County, 
after giving timely notice to counsel for plaintiff, and moved 
the court for leave to file pleadings in the action. After 
hearing argument of counsel, the Court entered an order permit-
ting defendant to file pleadings within ten days from the date 
of said order. Counsel for plaintiff objected to the Court's 
T 
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ruling in permitting pleadings to be filed. Within the ten 
day period, defendant filed a plea in abatement challenging 
the venue, and charging that the action should have been com-
menced in the Circuit Court of Nelson County or the Circuit 
Court of Goochland County. 
(a) Did the Court commit error in permitting 
pleadings to be filed after the expiration 
of twenty-one days after the date of ser-
vice of process? 
(b) How should the Court rule on the plea in 
abatement? 
6. John P. Jones purchased four new tires for his 1970 
Chevrolet from Roanoke Tire Company, a local retail tire store, 
on March 10, 1973. On that same date, those four tires were 
fitted to Jones~ car by employees of Roanoke Tire Company. On 
April 2, 1973 1 while driving his car with the new tires south 
on Interstate 81, one of the tires blew out causing Jones to 
wreck and to be injured. A personal injury action was com-. 
menced by Jones, and process was served upon Roanoke Tire 
Company's Registered Agent on r.1ay 1, 1973. On May 10, 1973, 
counsel for Roanoke Tire Company filed its grounds of defense 
and a plea of contributory negligence. On May 24, 1973, 
counsel for Roanoke Tire Company learned for the first time 
that the tire which allegedly blew out was manufactured by 
Fireball Tire Company. 
May Roanoke Tire Company proceed against Fireball 
Tire Company in this pending action?' 
7. John Doe commenced an action in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Virginia against 
Richard Rowe. Rowe employed John Q. Lawyer to represent him.' 
Lawyer examined the plaintiffus complaint and determined that 
it did not state a cause of action. He further concluded that 
,if a demurrer was overruled, his client should rely upon the 
defenses of asslli~ption of risk and contributory negligence. 
Being unfamiliar with Federal Practice and Procedure, and not 
having the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in his office, 
Lawyer called upon his friend, Blackstone Barrister, to ask 
his advice on how he should plead. In discussing the matter 
with Barrister, Lawyer stated that it was his opinion that he 
should file a demurrer to the complaint for the purpose of 
testing its sufficiency, and that if the demurrer was over~ 
ruled it would not be nece~sary to plead aosumption of risk and 
contributory negligence, as these defenses could oe raised at 
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trial by the offer of evidence. 
What advice should Barrister give Lawyer with 
respect to the following: 
(a) Whether he should file a demurrer 
to the complaint to test its legal 
sufficiency? 
(b) Whether he can raise the issues of 
assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence by tender of proof at the 
trial of the action? 
8. Alexander Mundy was indicted and tried in) the Corpo-
ration Court for the City of Alexandria on a charge of break-
ing and entering. During the trial of the case, the Commonwealth 
offered no evidence to prove that the offense had been committed 
within the corporate limits of the City of Alexandria. 
At the conclusion of the evidence for the Commonwealth, 11 
the accused moved the court to strike the evidence on the ground 1>~ 1 ·' 
that the evidence was insufficient to identify the accused as ji 
the party who had committed the offense. The motion was over- ~ 
ruled and exceptions noted. \Z;.0">:. 
The accused offered no evidence in his own defense. 
The case was submitted to the jury who in due course 
returned a verdict of guilty and fixed the punishment of the 
accused at thres years in the state penitentiary. The accused 
thereupon moved to set aside the verdict on the ground that the 
Commonwealth had failed to establish venue by proving that the tt.t·,i... 
offense had been committed within the corporation limits of the \ '~', r.J· 
City of Alexandria. , ~vtl~'-' J 
\"') t ,\'I - kl·'\ 
How should the Court rule on this motion? \-..1-~ ' I 
9. Tom Rand is 30 years of age and is the beneficiary 
of a trust created by the will of his father who died in 1965. 
The trust res consists of corporate stocks and bonds. Upon the 
death of the testator, Harold Hoge duly qualified, and has 
since acted as Trustee, actively managing the trust and its 
investments. By the terms of the trust, it is to terminate 
when Tom Rand reaches 35 years of age and he is to then receive 
all trust assets free of the trust. Rand has just learned that 
Hoge has breached the trust by selling from the trust ~ 600 
shares of the common stock of General Motors Corporation, and 
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wrongfully using an unknown part of the proceeds for his own 
purposes. Rand consults you and asks how he properly may pro-
ceed against Hoge to require the latter to make good the loss 
occasioned by the breach. 
How should you advise him? 
10. Herbert Trent, a resident of Henrico County, Virginia, 
comes to your off ice and tells you there is pending in the 
Circuit Court of Henrico County a suit for specific performance·.-
brought by Albert Jones against John Clay in which Jones prays 
that Clay be compelled to convey to Jones a tract of 145 acres 
of land lying in the County, that in his bill Jones has alleged 
that the suit is brought upon a written contract made between 
Jones and Clay on May 14, 1973 by which contract Clay agreed to 
sell the tract to Jones for $120,0001 that he (Trent) has in 
his possession a written contract executed by him and by Clay 
on May 10, 197~ by the terms of which Clay agreed to sell the 
same tract to Trent for the price of $110,000; that both his 
and Jonesv contracts were duly recorded when made; that he 
(Trent) is ready, willing and able to pay the agreed price of 
$110,000 to Clay on the delivery by Clay of his deed conveying 
the tract to Trent1 and that Trent has so advised Clay, but 
that Clay has refused to perform his contract with Trent saying 
he believes he can readily sell the property to others for not 
less than $150,000. Trent then asks you what, if anything, can 
be done by him to fully protect his interests. 
What should your advice be? 
